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Abstract
The assessment and mitigation of risks related to
the availability of the IT infrastructure is becoming in-
creasingly important in modern organizations. Unfor-
tunately, present standards for Risk Assessment and
Mitigation show limitations when evaluating and mit-
igating availability risks. This is due to the fact that
they do not fully consider the dependencies between the
constituents of an IT infrastructure that are paramount
in large enterprises. These dependencies make the
technical problem of assessing availability issues very
challenging. In this paper we define a method and a
tool for carrying out a Risk Mitigation activity which
allows to assess the global impact of a set of risks and
to choose the best set of countermeasures to cope with
them. To this end, the presence of a tool is necessary
due to the high complexity of the assessment problem.
Our approach can be integrated in present Risk Man-
agement methodologies (e.g. COBIT) to provide a more
precise Risk Mitigation activity. We substantiate the
viability of this approach by showing that most of the
input required by the tool is available as part of a stan-
dard business continuity plan, and/or by performing a
common tool-assisted Risk Management.
1 Introduction
Information Risk Management is the process of as-
sessing the risks an organization’s IT infrastructure is
exposed to, and of developing strategies to manage
them. The process of Risk Management is usually
divided into two main steps: Risk Assessment (RA)
and Risk Mitigation (RM). The former activity iden-
tifies potential harmful threats to the information sys-
∗This work has been accomplished during the third author’s
stay at the University of Trento, Italy, supported by the Serenity
project. The first author is supported by the research project
PROSECCO. The second author is supported by the research
program Sentinels (www.sentinels.nl).
tems, while the latter consists of developing and imple-
menting a strategy to manage them. Nowadays, Risk
Management is often a primary task in enterprise or-
ganizations and it is widely considered a key factor for
improving an organization’s IT performance. Also, re-
cent legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
of 2002 or the international accord known as Basel
II [5] (International Convergence of Capital Measure-
ment and Capital Standards), explicitly requires this
kind of activity to be conducted to ensure stakeholders
that the organization is operating properly.
Among the three main security properties of in-
formation, Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
(CIA), the importance of availability has grown enor-
mously: nowadays, organizations strongly depend on
the availability of their information systems; moreover,
enterprise revenues are increasingly often directly de-
pendent on the availability of IT-related services (on-
line banking, reservations for e-tickets etc.). This fact
is confirmed by the increasing importance that Ser-
vice Level Agreements (SLAs) are gaining. Nowadays,
SLAs are considered one of the fundamental ways to
define and control the expected availability and the
quality of a given service and are widely used not only
between different organizations but also between units
of the same company.
That managing availability risks is particularly im-
portant is confirmed by the fact that most Risk Man-
agement methodologies specifically require, when the
mitigation phase takes place, the implementation of
a plan for Business Continuity (Business Continuity
Plan, BCP). A BCP describes which are the counter-
measures that have been chosen, which are the people
involved and which response procedures they should
take in case of a disruption event, to guarantee a timely
recovery.
Contribution In this paper we focus on assessing
and mitigating the risks related to the availability of
the IT infrastructure. This is particularly challenging
because of the (temporal) dependencies that link the
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various constituents of an IT infrastructure (machines,
processes, assets, etc.) with each other. In complex in-
formation systems, failure in a remote component may
propagate across the infrastructure and eventually af-
fect the availability of a good deal of the entire system.
Failure to appropriately assess the consequences of such
propagations will result in inaccurate RA and RMs.
We argue that current Risk Management method-
ologies (e.g. CobiT, ISO 17799 [18], ISO 13335 [17] or
OCTAVE [26]) show limitations when evaluating and
mitigating availability risks. This is due to the fact that
they do not fully consider the consequences of the func-
tional dependencies between the constituents of an IT
infrastructure: the consideration of these dependencies
is mostly left to the judgement of the assessor carrying
out the RA phase (although this is not made explicit
clearly). Thus, these methodologies can only be useful
to identify and fix individual risks an organization is ex-
posed to (see also Sec. 2). On the other hand, these de-
pendencies are considered in more specific assessment
methods such as the Business Continuity Plans, like in
the new standard BS25999 [16] (see Sec. 2 for a detailed
overview). These methods however do not specify how
to use this information for RM.
Summarizing, nowadays the process of assessing and
mitigating availability related risks depends very much
on the human expertise, making Risk Management
more an art than a science.
Our thesis is that it is possible to carry out an accu-
rate tool-based RM by using the data collected during
RA and BCP activities. To substantiate this thesis, in
this paper we present a framework and a tool for the as-
sessment and mitigation of availability-related IT risks.
The framework is based on modelling the IT infrastruc-
ture much in the same way as it is done according to
the BS25999 (which largely coincides with the data col-
lected by the KARISMA tool developed at KPMG for
RA, see Sec. 5). This model allows us to determine
how incidents will propagate across the organization,
and therefore what is the actual impact of incidents.
With this information, we can carry out an optimiza-
tion study by comparing the true expected benefit de-
termined by the different countermeasures that can be
put in place to cope with the various risks.
As we will mention, the computational complexity of
the problems posed by our method, make it impossible
to carry out the underlying analysis by hand, and this
is why the method we propose requires the presence
of an appropriate tool. We have implemented the tool
using UPPAAL CORA [21].
We consider our solution a concrete enhancement
to RM methodologies, providing automatic support to
better evaluate the IT relationships and dynamics.
2 Present Methodologies for Risk Man-
agement
There exists a number of standards and methodolo-
gies for Risk Management, among which COBIT (Con-
trol Objectives for Information and related Technol-
ogy) [11] and BS25999 [16] are of particular relevance
to our work. COBIT is the de facto standard for in-
formation control and IT Risk Management, address-
ing IT governance and control practices. It provides
a reference framework for managers, users and secu-
rity auditors. COBIT is mostly based on the concept
of control (be it technical or organizational) which is
used to asses, monitor and verify the current state of a
certain process (that may refer to procedures, human
resources, etc.) involved in the information system.
To implement COBIT the organization must bench-
mark its own processes against the control objectives
suggested by the framework, using the so-called ma-
turity models (derived from the Software Engineering
Institute’s Capability Maturity Model [27]). Maturity
models basically provide: (1) a measure expressing the
present state of an organization, (2) an efficient way
to decide which is the goal to achieve and, finally, (3)
a tool to evaluate progress toward the goal. Maturity
modelling enables gaps in capabilities to be identified
and demonstrated to management. Key Goal Indi-
cators (KGI) and Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
are then used to measure, respectively, when a process
has achieved the goal set by management and when
a goal is likely to be reached or not. Since COBIT
does not suggest any technical solution but only or-
ganizational solutions, organizations combine COBIT
and ISO 17799, applying the controls suggested in the
part Code of Practice for Information Security Man-
agement of the standard.
Although COBIT does not provide any practical so-
lution for mitigating the risks, it requires the organiza-
tion to implement a Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
to realize and improve the availability of an informa-
tion system and its core processes. Until recently, no
methodology was available to conduct in a precise way
this activity although it is of primary importance when
running a complex information system. The new stan-
dard for managing business continuity BS25999 [16] is
mainly focused on providing guidelines to understand,
develop and implement a BCP, and aims to provide
a standard methodology. This standard requires the
organization to complete different steps when prepar-
ing the BCP: (1) identify the activities/processes which
carry the core service used by the organization, (2)
identify the relationships/dependencies among them-
selves, (3) evaluate the impact of the disruption of
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the core services/processes previously identified (Busi-
ness Impact Analysis, BIA). The most critical activ-
ities/processes are intended to be the ones whose di-
rect/indirect monetary loss is significantly high.
When the risk has been assessed and evaluated, one
has to identify the best countermeasures to reduce the
risk. Typically, there exists a number of different solu-
tions (technical or organisational) from which business
and IT managers must choose the best one(s) meeting
the required security level given the available budget
(or finding the best compromise between the cost of
the countermeasures and the benefit they provide). As
we mentioned before, current methodologies are not
sufficiently taking into account how business processes
are linked together and the way a single incident could
propagate and affect the whole organization’s informa-
tion system. The fact that COBIT and ISO 17799 do
not consider dependencies between processes has even
greater impact in the mitigation phase of availability
risks: it is standard practice to protect the processes
whose availability has a greater direct impact on the or-
ganization goals, while a more accurate analysis reveals
in many cases that it is more cost effective to protect
some of the processes that have an indirect impact as
well.
3 Modelling Organizations and Inci-
dents
The framework we propose is based on a model of
the organization’s IT-related architecture (including a
part related to the organization’s business goals), and
a representation of the possible incidents. To simplify
the exposition, we indicate by R+ the set of positive
real numbers, and we use the following sets to indicate
domains: T is the set of all time intervals (expressed
in hours), Eur is the domain of monetary values (ex-
pressed in Euro).
Assumptions We start by providing a brief sum-
mary of the data we need to build the model. Later we
describe this data in more in detail. (1) An organiza-
tional model, consisting of: a set of entities (processes,
applications, etc.) and a set of relationships between
these entities. Relationships model which entities de-
pend on other entities and must contain an estimate
of how long an entity would be able to survive if an-
other entity it depends on becomes unavailable. We
express this measure in hours. (2) The cost associated
to the downtime of those processes directly affecting
the business objective of the organization (indirect re-
lationships are taken care of by the model). We express
this measure in Euro per hour. (3) A list of possible
incidents affecting the IT infrastructure, together with
a conservative estimate of the average downtime each
of them cause (per entity) given the controls already
in place. We also need an estimate of their expected
frequency. For the sake of uniformity, in the sequel
we express the downtime caused by each incident in
hours and their estimated frequency in times per year.
(4) A list of countermeasures. For each countermea-
sure we need an estimate of (a) their deployment and
maintenance costs (expressed in Euro per year), (b) the
effect is has on the estimated frequency of the incidents
and/or on the downtime they cause.
In Sec. 5 we address the problem of how and when this
data can be collected during the RA and BCP pro-
cesses.
Organizational model The basic elements of the
model are the constituents of the IT infrastructure.
We follow notable architecture frameworks such as TO-
GAF [29], Zachman [30] and ArchiMate [3] as well as
IT Governance solutions (IBM [12] and ISACA [11]),
to determine those elements, which may directly or in-
directly be involved in an incident: Processes, Applica-
tions and Information, Technology and Infrastructure
or Facilities. Processes describe critical processes nec-
essary to carry out the business, like manage orders
or invoicing. Applications and Information are objects
related to the software necessary to enable business op-
erations e.g. production control applications, customer
relationship management (CRM) applications or criti-
cal databases. Technology refers to systems, networks
and industry-specific technology needed to enable ap-
plications and data, and Infrastructure or Facilities are
physical locations necessary to house service technolo-
gies.
Running example - Part 1 We present here an ex-
ample (intentionally oversimplified) of the business/IT
infrastructure of a small bank segment with ten entities:
Id Description
p1 Customer management process
p2 Financial services process
a1 Home banking application
a2 On-line trading application
a3 Financial founds management application
db1 Checking account database
db2 Trading database
m1 Application server machine
m2 Oracle machine
m3 Oracle machine
n1 Network segment
p1 and p2 represent two business processes; a1, a2
and a3 are three applications supporting business pro-
cesses while db1 and db2 are two databases accessed by
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applications. Finally, m1, m2 and m3 are the three
machines running applications and n1 is the network
segment connecting the three machines.
We represent an organizational model using a graph,
where nodes represent the basic entities and labelled
edges between nodes represent their relationships. The
presence of an edge from node a to node b indicates
that b depends on a, and that if a becomes unavail-
able for long enough, b will become unavailable as well.
To model this correctly, we also need to indicate how
long b will be able to survive without the presence of
a. We do that by annotating each edge with the sur-
vival time: the time span the dependent entity can
survive if the other one fails. While for some relation-
ships, such as the dependency of an application onto
the machine it runs on, this amount is obviously set
to zero, in case of dependencies between applications
this can vary between zero and several hours (e.g. in
case that an application needs to be fed by another one
with data at regular time intervals). Sometimes it is
possible to extract this information from the functional
requirements documentation or from the SLA specifi-
cation. Although one can argue that these values could
change over time, we have empirically verified (by in-
specting documentation of several enterprise organiza-
tions) that this usually is not the case: organizations
do not require such a level of detail yet.
Definition 3.1 An Organizational Model is a pair
〈N,→〉 where N is a set of nodes and →⊆ N×N×T .
We write n1
t−→ n2 as shorthand for (n1, n2, t) ∈→.
An organizational model allows one to express e.g.
the dependencies of hardware components on the phys-
ical environment they are located in, the dependency
of an application on the machines it runs on, and the
dependency of a business process on the applications
supporting it. We will show in Sec. 5 that this graph
can be built in a fully automatic way.
Running example - Part 2 Figure 1 shows an or-
ganizational model built with the entities from Table 1.
The edges connecting n1 to m1, m2 and m3 express
the dependency of the machines on the network con-
nection with other machines. The connections from
m1 to a1, a2 and a3, from m2 to db1 and from m3 to
db2 express the dependency of software processes (ap-
plications or databases) on the machines they run on.
For all of these connections the survival time is set to
zero, since no entity can survive the disruption of the
ones it depends on, not even for a short time. In turn,
p1 is depends on both a1 and a2, since the customer
management is achieved by providing internet banking
Figure 1. An organizational model example
and on-line trading, but with different time constraints
(five hours for a1 and only one hour for a2). Similar
reasoning apply to a1 and p2.
Notice that dependency relationships are and re-
lationships: a node depending on two or more other
nodes is disrupted even if just one of these are affected
by an incident. For the sake of simplicity, in this work
we do not consider or relationships, even though it
would be simple to include them in our model.
The number of entities can be very large in a
real business environment. However the information
needed to build the model is already available after a
RA (the first RA step, according to NIST methodol-
ogy [28], is system characterization). For instance, the
KARISMA tool developed at KPMG to support RA re-
quires – among other things – the collection of enough
data to build an accurate organizational model. Any
other tool based on the same standard methodology
will basically do the same.
Incidents and their propagation Once the model
of the architecture is defined, it is possible to simulate
the availability of the system during and after the oc-
currence of an incident. We define incidents as events
causing the unavailability of a given set of resources for
a given time.
Definition 3.2 (Incident) Let org = 〈N,→〉 be an
organization. An incident i for org is a mapping
i : N → T .
For instance, if we expect that the average occur-
rence of incident i would bring down machine m1 for 3
hours, we model this by setting i(m1) = 3.
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Running example - Part 3 Let us now introduce
three different incidents affecting the availability of m3.
Id Description Target Downtime
i1 Disk failure m3 9h
i2 Power disruption m3 3h
i3 OS failure m3 2h
In i1 one of m3’s hard disks is broken and the down-
time is the average time required to replace the broken
disk and restore data. i2 consists of a power disruption
in the building hosting m3, in this case the downtime
is the average duration of a power disruption. i3 con-
sists in an OS failure, due to software bugs, causing the
consequent freeze of applications running in m3 and the
downtime is the average time needed to detect the inci-
dent and reboot m3.
Every incident directly involves one or more entities,
causing them to be unavailable for a certain amount of
time. During this time the incident may propagate to
other entities, following the organizational model.
Definition 3.3 We say that an incident propagates
from a node n1 to n2, if they have a functional relation-
ship and the unavailability time of n1, due to the inci-
dent, exceeds the survival time of n2 w.r.t. n1. Causing
it to become unavailable until the incident is resolved.
Running example - Part 4 The following graph
shows how i1 propagates across our organization
Assume that i1 occurs at t = 0: i1 brings down m3; at
the same time db2 becomes unavailable, since its sur-
vival time w.r.t. m3 is zero. After five minutes a2 goes
down and and a3 follows after fifteen minutes. Accord-
ingly to the organizational model, after one hour from
the disruption of a2, the process p1 goes down and af-
ter eight hours p2 goes down as well. After i1 has been
repaired, nine hours after t0, all entities are repaired in
turn.
Downtime With this information, we can finally de-
fine Downtime(i, n): the downtime caused by incident
i on node n (including propagation). This is the crucial
information needed in the Risk Evaluation and Mitiga-
tion phases by evaluating the global consequences of
an incident, as we will address in Sec. 4.
4 A Model for Risk Mitigation
The system we introduced in Sec. 3 allows us to
model the propagation of incidents. We now show how
we can use this information for selecting the best set
of countermeasures; technically we aim at finding the
set of countermeasures which minimizes the cost due to
the forecasted downtime of relevant business processes.
4.1 Risk Evaluation
The first step towards Risk Mitigation is an accurate
evaluation of the costs associated to the downtime of
each process. In an organization, there are usually only
a few processes which – if unavailable – directly cause
a real damage (in our running example, only p1 and
p2). Clearly, this cost depends on the business goals of
the company (a one hour downtime of the web server
has a much higher monetary cost at Google than at
an insurance company with comparable revenues). To
model the cost of incidents we now define the damage
evaluation function, relating the disruption time to the
(monetary) loss affecting the organization.
Definition 4.1 Let org = 〈N,→〉 be an organization.
The Business-driven damage evaluation function (D)
is a mapping from downtime to costs D : N × T →
Eur .
In our simplified example, the downtime cost of p2
is 120 Euro per hour (see Fig. 1), so D(p2, x) = 120×
x. This means that the occurrence of a incident i1
(which – after propagation – causes a downtime of 55
minutes on p2) would create a damage of 110 Euro. In
practice, D may well not be linear (a downtime of 24
hours may well cause more losses that 24 downtimes
of one hour). In general, D should be provided by
the organization’s business department for the most
important business processes and, in general, for all
the business-relevant entities in the organization. One
can argue that providing an accurate D function can
be a time expensive task. In our experience this does
not represents a particular problem, as the D function
need to be defined only for the few business critical
processes.
Frequencies and Global Cost Having determined
the cost associated to an incident, we need now just one
last factor for an accurate risk evaluation, and that is
an assessment of frequency (likelihood) of an incident.
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Definition 4.2 Given a set of incidents I, the inci-
dent frequency, Freq(i), is a mapping I → R+.
For instance, Freq(x) = 0.1 means that estimates
indicate that incident x is likely to happen once in
ten years. We should mention that NIST [28, 7] sug-
gests a qualitative approach to assess likelihood (High,
Medium, Low), while CobiT [11] promotes both qual-
itative and quantitative approaches. For our goals, we
require a numerical value, which in practice can be de-
rived from the past experience of the assessment team
or from public domain statistics.
Now, the downtime function computed using the or-
ganizational model together with the damage and the
frequency evaluation allows us to compute the expected
cost (per year) due to service downtime for the whole
organization.
Definition 4.3 Let org = 〈N,→〉 be an organization,
I be a set of incidents and D(n, t) the damage evalu-
ation for org. The estimated downtime cost for the
system is defined as
Esdc(I) =
∑
i,n∈I×N
D(n,Downtime(i, n))× Freq(i)
Going back to our example, if we estimate i1, i2
and i3 can happen respectively 5, 12 and 50 times per
year, then the estimated downtime cost of the system
is approximately 10,000 Euro.
4.2 Risk Mitigation
The goal of Risk Mitigation is to bring down the
estimated downtime cost by applying a set of counter-
measures, which can be either technical or organiza-
tional. To achieve full generality we define a counter-
measure as a function which modifies the organization,
the set of incidents as well as their frequencies. Each
countermeasure has also a cost per year (summing the
amortization and the maintenance costs).
Definition 4.4 (Countermeasure) Let org =
〈N,→〉 be an organization, I be a set of incidents and
Freq be the frequency estimate for I. A countermea-
sure c, is a pair 〈m, cost〉 where m maps org, I, Freq
into org′, I ′, F req′, and cost ∈ Eur is the cost per
time unit (year).
We note that in practice that most countermeasures
fall into one of two classes: frequency countermeasures
and time countermeasures, accordingly to the result-
ing effect. The former reduce the frequency of a given
incident, while the latter reduce the downtime due to
the incident. In frequency countermeasures, the pro-
jection of m on org′, I ′ is the identity function. It is
worth noting that a countermeasure completely pre-
venting an incident can be modelled by by setting to
zero either the frequency or the downtime relative to
the incident.
Running example - Part 5 The following table re-
ports a list of countermeasures to be applied on m3 to
mitigate the negative effects of incidents i1-i3.
Id Description Cost I Freq Downt.
¿/y bef aft bef aft
c1 New disks 1000 i1 3 5 9 9
c2 UPS 3000 i2 12 12 1 3
c3 Backup machine 4000 I - - 2 -
c4 Service pack 900 i3 20 50 2 2
c5 New OS version 6200 i3 5 50 2 2
c6 Patch #143 300 i3 40 50 2 2
c7 Patch #146 300 i3 42 50 2 2
c8 Disk backup
strategy
2000 i1 5 5 5 9
Notice that c1-c7 are technical countermeasures while
c8 is organizational; moreover c1, c4-c7 are frequency
countermeasures since their effect is to reduce the fre-
quency of certain incidents, while c2, c3 and c8 are time
countermeasures since they reduce the downtime of m3.
The following graph shows the propagation of incident
i1 after the application of c8, which reduces the down-
time of m3 to five hours. Since the survival time of
p2 (eight hours) is longer than the downtime of a2, p2
is never disrupted by this incident, and the component
relative to p2 of the cost of i1 is zeroed, reducing the
overall estimated downtime cost.
It is usually possible to apply more than one coun-
termeasure on the same entity, but for this we have
to take into account that one countermeasure may be
incompatible with another one. An OS patch, for exam-
ple, can be incompatible with other patches; moreover,
deploying a backup machine can be useless if other
backup techniques are already in place.
For instance, in our Running Example, countermea-
sures c4-c7 are mutually incompatible: this because the
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service pack can not be installed if single patches are
already installed, and because installing patches for the
old OS version with the new version already installed
would be impossible.
By combining the organizational model, incidents
with their cost and their frequency and countermea-
sures we now give a formal definition of best set of coun-
termeasures as the set of countermeasures that reduces
the most the estimated downtime cost (taking into ac-
count the cost of the countermeasures). In the follow-
ing definition we first extend Esdc function to take into
account the selected countermeasures. In the following
definition we denote by Downtime[C](i, n) the down-
time the incident i causes on node n in presence of
countermeasures C = {c1, . . . , cn}. Likewise, freq[C](i)
is the expected frequency of incident i presence of coun-
termeasures C = {c1, . . . , cn}.
Definition 4.5 Let org be an organization, I be a set
of incidents, Freq be the frequency estimate for I, and
C be a set of countermeasures.
 We call the estimated global cost of inci-
dents I in presence of C, Esdc(I, C) the value:∑
i,n∈I×N D(n,Downtime[C](i, n))× Freq[C](i)
 We say that BC ⊆ C is a best set of countermea-
sures (w.r.t. C) if the countermeasures in BC are
pairwise compatible, and for every D ⊆ C of pair-
wise compatible countermeasures, Egdc(I,BC) ≤
Egdc(I,D).
Thus, the the best set of countermeasures is the
one minimizing the expected global cost. Similarly,
the expected benefit of a given set of countermeasures
is the difference between the expected downtime cost
Esdc(I) and the expected downtime cost after applying
the countermeasures: Egc(I,BC).
Running example - Part 6 We can now compute
Esdc considering the three incidents (i1-i3) and each
possible combination of countermeasures (c1-c8). Re-
call that only the disruption of p1 and p2 involve a
loss to the organization (see Fig. 1). The result is
BC = {c1, c4}, i.e. the most cost-effective strategy
to mitigate the risk is to install the OS service pack
and to update m3’s disks.
Summarizing, our model provides IT managers with
an effective way of choosing the best set of countermea-
sures for a given system. For space reasons, we have
not addressed other optimization possibilities which are
made possible by this model, but it is easy to see that
one can use it to find for instance “the least expensive
set of countermeasures which bring the expected down-
time of service A down to 10 hours per year” or “the
best set of countermeasures within a given budget”.
5 Feasibility
Input Data The main concern regarding the feasi-
bility of our approach is whether the set of data it
requires is easy to collect. If this was not the case,
organizations would not be willing to accept it. Fortu-
nately, the data it requires is typically available after
RA and BCP: first of all, an accurate map of the IT
infrastructure, is readily available after a BCP carried
out following the BS25999 [16] standard (and is also
after RAs). Secondly, an inventory of possible inci-
dents, together with their frequency has to be com-
piled during the RA. Finally, a BCP should provide
(according to BS25999 standard) a complete evaluation
of the effectiveness of chosen incident response strate-
gies (i.e. countermeasures): thus, the organization is
also required to quantify downtime costs of the differ-
ent entities before and after the countermeasures have
been applied.
To further substantiate our argument, we note the
this data is also collected by tools devised to assist
the RA and RM processes. For instance, the Italian
branch of KPMG [20] (a worldwide company deliver-
ing also Information Risk Advisory services) has de-
veloped a customizable tool, KARISMA (Kpmg Ad-
vanced RISk MAnagement), to support their RA activ-
ities. Among the information KARISMA collects via a
question-driven procedure, there is a map of the busi-
ness process entities (together with their relationships)
and the Business Impact Analysis values. KARISMA
is based on COBIT, and it is very likely that other
tools for RA based on COBIT would collect the same
information. Our system can thus be regarded as an
additional component for KARISMA or for any other
COBIT-based tool for RA, supporting in particular the
Business Continuity Planning activity.
We also note that most of the information re-
quired to build the organizational model is also avail-
able when applying to an organization an architectural
framework, such as TOGAF [29], Zachman [30] and
ArchiMate [3]. Indeed, the layers defined in those
frameworks are similar to the ones we adopt for our
model, though used for different purposes (e.g. archi-
tectural support, new component impact evaluation,
etc.). Since those project are widely employed (Archi-
Mate for instance is used by ABN Amro and the Dutch
Tax Office), and are supported by several tools, they
provide us an indirect confirmation of the feasibility of
actually obtaining the data needed by our model.
Summarizing, our tool does not require organiza-
tions to acquire new information (i.e. to employ new
resources), rather it uses in a different way the infor-
mation already available after RA and BCP.
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Computational complexity The second concern
regarding the feasibility of our approach is whether the
algorithms underlying our framework are not too com-
plex to be carried out in reasonable time. It is easy
to see that – even if we assume that the organizational
graph is acyclic – evaluating the optimal of counter-
measures has complexity in the order of (e× r× i× c!)
where e is the total number of entities, r is the total
number of relationships between entities, i is the total
number of possible incidents and, finally, c is the to-
tal number of possible countermeasures. The presence
of cycles could increase the complexity, but we believe
that practical situations present graphs that can be
rendered acyclic after some preprocessing. The only
problematic factor in the equation is of c!, which in-
dicates that the presence of a relatively large set of
countermeasures would make it infeasible to carry out
a brute-force analysis to find the best set of counter-
measures. Presently, we are working at a brute force
implementation which is already giving satisfactory re-
sults on real datasets, and we have developed heuristics
based algorithms finding a local optimum whose com-
plexity is (e× r × i× c3), which give very satisfactory
results (in our experiments, the local optimum always
coincides with the global optimum). Other ways to
bring down the c! include automatically splitting the
set of countermeasures into various set of independent
countermeasures, which will make it possible to apply
compositional methods.
6 Implementation
The actual implementation requires us to realize an
algorithm which (a) explores the organizational model
to simulate the consequences of the incidents, (b) eval-
uates the global cost of a set of incidents, (c) simulates
the new behaviour of the organizational model in pres-
ence of a set of countermeasures and (d) evaluates the
new global cost of the set of incidents with different
subsets of countermeasures.
To realize this we use in first instance model check-
ing [9], which is a technique to algorithmically analyse
concurrent systems, typically used for verifying if (a
model of) the system satisfies some given properties,
often specified as a temporal logic formulas. The rea-
son of this choice is that model checkers are already de-
vised to quickly explore a graph of several (thousands
of) possible system behavioural traces, to find the one
realizing a given property. Therefore, model checkers
provide us with a way of doing fast prototyping without
sacrificing performance too much. Among the several
model checkers available (e.g., SPIN [15], SMV [24],
etc.) we have adopted UPPAAL [22], because (1) it
allows to specify a time dependent system (such as the
one we need to model) and (2) its extension UPPAAL
CORA allows to solve optimization problems such as
those previously required in points (b) and (d).
UPPAAL requires the system to be specified as a
a timed automaton [9, 6], which is a finite automaton
extended with a finite set of real-valued clocks. Clock
constraints, i.e. guards on edges, are used to restrict
the behaviour of the automaton. UPPAAL CORA,
is an extension of UPPAAL for cost optimal reach-
ability analysis which applies the theory of Linearly
Priced Timed Automata (LPTA) [21]. LPTA extend
the model of timed automata with prices on all edges
and locations. In these models, the cost of taking an
edge is the price associated with it, and the price of
a location gives the cost-rate applied when delaying in
that location. In UPPAAL CORA prices are defined
by means of an implicit monotonically growing variable
called cost.
UPPAAL has the additional advantage of allowing
us to map in a very natural and straightforward way
every element of our model into a timed automaton
with the same behaviour. This one-to-one translation
ensures the absence of side effects due to the implemen-
tation. For the sake of presentation we do not report
here further implementation details.
To test our implementation we used a dataset rela-
tive to a real insurance company collected by KPMG
auditors using KARISMA during a RA. The dataset
contains all of the information needed to build the orga-
nizational model (19 macro business processes and 122
sub-processes); the remaining information (about in-
cidents, costs and countermeasures) was also provided
by the KPMG auditing team who conducted the as-
sessment. In first instance, to avoid the state explo-
sion problem and maintain a reasonable computational
time, we performed the analysis on portions of the in-
frastructure, and then merged results. In second in-
stance we realized a translation of the UPPAAL model
into ProLog. This second implementation allowed us to
deal with the entire dataset at once, without splitting
the IT infrastructure, and tens of incidents while main-
taining the computational time in the order of minutes.
We carried out optimal analysis for partitions of up
to 18 countermeasures and a suboptimal analysis that
could deal with thousands of them, on a 1.5GHz Pen-
tium M notebook with 1Gb RAM.
7 Related work
There exist various academic frameworks for carry-
ing out RA, but they all differ from our proposal in that
they do not model the propagation of incidents across
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an organization as precisely as we do. For instance,
Lenstra and Voss [23] present a quantitative approach
to IS risk management to determine the optimal RM
strategy given a limited budget. Their approach re-
quires performing a risk assessment on all the applica-
tion supporting business processes and identifying the
(monetary) loss due to each threat on the business pro-
cess it supports, thus the risk is evaluated in terms of
the likelihood and the loss. Authors define an action
plan (set of countermeasures) as something influencing
the likelihood of a threat thus reducing the risk; fur-
thermore they associate a cost to it. The selection of
the best set of action plans consists in finding the set
that mostly reduces the likelihood of all threats within
a given budget. Since this approach is designed to deal
with threats to all the three aspects of information se-
curity (CIA), to keep it feasible it lacks in a complete
representation of the constituents of an IT infrastruc-
ture (machines, facilities, etc.) and in modelling the
time dependencies between them, which - as we have
discussed in the introduction - is essential for prop-
erly modelling the availability risks. Our model, on
the other hand, being specifically tailored for availabil-
ity risks takes into consideration the time dependencies
and therefore allows to simulate how an incident prop-
agates across the organization.
Furthermore, the authors choice of allowing a sin-
gle, atomic, action plan per threat implies that the risk
management team should already have found manually
the best set of countermeasures to be applied in re-
sponse to an incident. The proposed framework then,
simply decides if applying or not this set of countermea-
sures. On the other hand our model is able to compute
the best set of countermeasures without requiring any
pre-processing phase and allowing one to find a more
fine-grained solution.
Asnar and Giorgini [4] introduce an extended Tro-
pos [8] goal model to analyse risk at organization level
and to identify and enumerate relevant countermea-
sures for RM. Their approach is mainly devoted to the
enumeration of incidents and countermeasures, while
our approach focuses on selecting and prioritizing in-
cidents to be mitigated and possible countermeasures
to perform the mitigation. Another proposal is that of
Aagedal et al. [1], who developed the CORAS frame-
work to produce an improved methodology for pre-
cise, unambiguous, and efficient risk analysis of secu-
rity critical systems. CORAS focuses on the tight in-
tegration of viewpoint-oriented visual modelling in the
RA process, using an UML-based approach in the con-
text of security and RA. Our approach is orthogonal
to CORAS, in the sense that we could use the output
of CORAS to feed out tool.
In addition to academic work there exist a number of
commercial tools supporting the Risk Management and
RM process. The most closely related to our work are
CounterMeasures and GSTool. Alion’s CounterMea-
sures [2] performs Risk Management based on the NIST
800 series and OMB Circular A-130 USA standards. It
provides the ability to perform cost/benefit analysis
and ROI on countermeasures. GStool [14] is devel-
oped by Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
to assist users of the IT Baseline Protection Manual.
GStool supports a qualitative assessment of protection
requirements. The main difference between these ap-
proaches and ours is that they face the countermeasure
selection by an economic prospective (ROI) or a tech-
nical prospective only, rather we merge the two aspects
in an holistic behavioural model of the whole organiza-
tion. For a wider list of Risk Management supporting
tools refer to [13].
Finally, our work has some analogy with some pro-
posal for using model checking to assess the survivabil-
ity of distributed systems [19, 10]. Jha and Wing [19]
use the NuSMV model checker to model the dis-
tributed environment and generate a failure scenario
graph (sum of counterexamples of survivability prop-
erties) by injecting faults into the model. Secondly,
they add some additional information about the prob-
ability of harmful events to perform reliability analysis
and cost/benefit analysis of possible countermeasures.
Our approach differs in that we model also time de-
pendencies between entities: thus we are able to per-
form a more accurate evaluation of the global impact.
Furthermore our approach is strictly focused on infor-
mation Risk Management. Cloth and Haverkort [10]
develop a model checking-based approach to evalu-
ate the survivability of a system. They describe the
system as a Stochastic Petri Net and then automati-
cally convert it into a Continuous Time Markov Chain
(CTMC). Finally they use a model checking engine to
obtain a time-probability chart that expresses the re-
covery probability in relation to the recovery time. The
scope of their approach (1) is limited to a particular
distributed environment, considering much more fine
grained features and (2) only the recovery time is the
desired output. This is a very appreciated requirement
when dealing with dependability issues in system de-
sign, but is not suitable for large infrastructures con-
sidered in Risk Management. On the other hand, our
approach is devised to provide the best countermeasure
set.
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8 Discussion, Future Work and Limita-
tions
In this paper we focus on the mitigation of risks re-
lated to the availability of an organization’s IT infras-
tructure. The contribution consists of a methodology
and a tool for carrying out a Risk Mitigation activity
which allows to assess the global impact of a set of risks
and to choose the best set of countermeasures to cope
with them. This is achieved by employing a model
which allows us to represent the actual propagation of
an incident across the organization. To this end, the
presence of a tool is necessary due to the complexity of
the propagation algorithm.
We argue that the input required by our approach is
typically already available after a serious RA and BCP
assessments, which makes our proposal attractive as
it does not require the collection of new information.
Indeed we believe that our approach can be integrated
in Risk Management methodologies to provide a more
precise Risk Mitigation activity.
Our approach is aimed at finding the set of counter-
measures which allow to minimize the expected yearly
cost due to the unavailability of IT services. Here we
note that a related organization goal is that of achiev-
ing a given RTO (recovery time objective): i.e. the lat-
est point in time at which operation must resume after
a failure. While this does not diminish the value of our
proposal, we believe that our model for the propaga-
tion of incidents can be extended to analyse the steps
that have to be taken to achieve the given RTO. This
is one of the targets for our future work.
Actually, our present system could already be used
for this purpose by employing a cost function which
is zero before the RTO and very high after the RTO.
However, we must warn that using such a highly dis-
continuous cost function may result in an inaccurate
analysis.
Finally, our system is particularly suited to support
continuous risk management [25]: thanks to its fine
granularity, it can be easily reviewed to match situa-
tional changes, allowing for early detection of service
deterioration, and prompt reaction to changing envi-
ronments.
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